Institutional Facts as Intentional Objects On Searle’s Theory of Institutional Facts

Pavla Toráčová

The study focuses on two problems in Searle’s theory of institutional facts: first, on the problem of unified ontology, i.e. whether and how facts whose very existence depends on intentionality of conscious beings can be part of the physical world; and second, on the discrepancy caused by Searle’s requirement to elimininate the intentionalistic account in favor of a causalistic account. The author aims to show that Searle’s arguments for this requirement are not justified and that the intentionalistic account can be not only preserved, but even radicalized in such a way that institutional facts turn out to be a kind of intentional objects. As to the problem of unified ontology, a new strategy, based on Searle’s distinction between causal and non-causal agentive functions, is suggested.