Philosophie als strenge Wissenschaft. II: Kants systematische Begründung der Metaphysik als System der Selbsterkenntnis der reinen Vernunft

Jindřich Karásek

Having discovered a new approach, Kant succeeds where Wolff had failed, since he adopts a new teleological proposition: the relationships obtaining within the metaphysica specialis have an important function in the processual self-knowledge of pure reason, and consequently the former can be derived from the latter, which allows Kant to proceed strictly a priori. Part II shows that Kant differs from Wolff in that he gives an ontological primacy to rational psychology, and this is due to Kant’s view that the objects of our consciousness in their formal character must be developed from the categorically formed structure of the original synthetic unity of apperception. The conclusion of Kant’s justificatory attempt is that the objects of the metaphysica specialis are re-constituted in their noumenal character.